BEFORE THE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In the Matter of:

PARENT ON BEHALF OF STUDENT,

v.

PETALUMA CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT.

OAH CASE NO. 2013070667

ORDER DENYING NOTICE OF INSUFFICENCY AND ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

On July 15, 2013, Parents on behalf of Student filed a Due Process Hearing Request ¹ (complaint) naming Petaluma City School District (District). On July 23, 2013, District filed a Notice of Representation, an Answer to the Complaint, a timely Notice of Insufficiency (NOI) and a motion to dismiss the complaint. Student did not file a response to the motion to dismiss. Both the NOI and the motion to dismiss are addressed by this Order and, for the reasons discussed below, both are denied.

Notice of Insufficiency

The named parties to a due process hearing request have the right to challenge the sufficiency of the complaint.² The party filing the complaint is not entitled to a hearing unless the complaint meets the requirements of Title 20 United States Code section 1415(b)(7)(A).

A complaint is sufficient if it contains: (1) a description of the nature of the problem of the child relating to the proposed initiation or change concerning the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education (FAPE) to the child; (2) facts relating to the problem; and (3) a proposed resolution of the problem to the extent known and available to the party at the time.³ These requirements prevent vague and confusing complaints, and promote fairness by providing the

¹ A request for a due process hearing under Education Code section 56502 is the due process complaint notice required under Title 20 United States Code section 1415(b)(7)(A).

² 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) & (c).

³ 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(7)(A)(ii)(III) & (IV).

named parties with sufficient information to know how to prepare for the hearing and how to participate in resolution sessions and mediation.⁴

The complaint provides enough information when it provides "an awareness and understanding of the issues forming the basis of the complaint." The pleading requirements should be liberally construed in light of the broad remedial purposes of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and the relative informality of the due process hearings it authorizes. Whether the complaint is sufficient is a matter within the sound discretion of the Administrative Law Judge.

Student's complaint alleges that he is autistic, that he is entering the sixth grade at Mary Collins Cherry Valley School, and that his district of residence is Petaluma City School District. He further alleges that in 2013 the District refused to include transportation to school in his individualized education program (IEP) after Student's mother requested transportation. Student's proposed resolution is that the District provide him with transportation to school. These facts are sufficient to state a single claim under the IDEA, namely that District denied Student a FAPE by failing to offer Student transportation as part of his IEP. The facts are sufficient to put District on notice of the issue and allow District to prepare for and participate in a resolution session and mediation. Therefore, the complaint is sufficient.

Motion to Dismiss

The purpose of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) (20 U.S.C. § 1400 et. seq.) is to "ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education" (FAPE), and to protect the rights of those children and their parents. (20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A), (B), and (C); see also Ed. Code, § 56000.) A party has the right to present a complaint "with respect to any matter relating to the identification,

⁴ See, H.R.Rep. No. 108-77, 1st Sess. (2003), p. 115; Sen. Rep. No. 108-185, 1st Sess. (2003), pp. 34-35.

⁵ Sen. Rep. No. 108-185, *supra*, at p. 34.

⁶ Alexandra R. v. Brookline School Dist. (D.N.H., Sept. 10, 2009, No. 06-cv-0215-JL) 2009 WL 2957991 at p.3 [nonpub. opn.]; Escambia County Board of Educ. v. Benton (S.D.Ala. 2005) 406 F. Supp.2d 1248, 1259-1260; Sammons v. Polk County School Bd. (M.D. Fla., Oct. 28, 2005, No. 8:04CV2657T24EAJ) 2005 WL 2850076 at p. 3[nonpub. opn.]; but cf. M.S.-G. v. Lenape Regional High School Dist. (3d Cir. 2009) 306 Fed.Appx. 772, at p. 3[nonpub. opn.].

⁷ Assistance to States for the Education of Children With Disabilities and Preschool Grants for Children With Disabilities, 71 Fed.Reg. 46540-46541, 46699 (Aug. 14, 2006).

evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child." (20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6); Ed. Code, § 56501, subd. (a) [party has a right to present a complaint regarding matters involving proposal or refusal to initiate or change the identification, assessment, or educational placement of a child; the provision of a FAPE to a child; the refusal of a parent or guardian to consent to an assessment of a child; or a disagreement between a parent or guardian and the public education agency as to the availability of a program appropriate for a child, including the question of financial responsibility].) The jurisdiction of OAH is limited to these matters. (*Wyner v. Manhattan Beach Unified Sch. Dist.* (9th Cir. 2000) 223 F.3d 1026, 1028-1029.)

Although OAH will grant motions to dismiss allegations that are facially outside of OAH jurisdiction (e.g., civil rights claims, section 504 claims, enforcement of settlement agreements, incorrect parties, etc.....), special education law does not provide for a summary judgment procedure.

Here, the Motion is not limited to matters that are facially outside of OAH jurisdiction, but instead seeks a ruling on the merits. Specifically, a factual issue exists as to whether Student is entitled to free transportation under the IDEA as part of his IEP. This issue requires factual findings by the hearing ALJ, and is therefore not appropriate for a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is denied.

ORDER

- 1. The complaint is sufficient under Title 20 United States Code section 1415(b)(7)(A)(ii).
 - 2. District's motion to dismiss is denied.
- 3. All mediation, prehearing conference, and hearing dates in this matter are confirmed.

Dated: July 30, 2013

/s/

ADRIENNE L. KRIKORIAN Administrative Law Judge Office of Administrative Hearings